In this paper, we present evidence on empirical connections between crime and education, using various data sources from Britain. A robust finding is that criminal activity is negatively associated with higher levels of education. However, it is essential to ensure that the direction of causation flows from education to crime. Therefore, we identify the effect of education on participation in criminal activity using changes in compulsory school leaving age laws over time to account for the endogeneity of education. In this causal approach, for property crimes, the negative crime-education relationship remains strong and significant. The implications of these findings are unambiguous and clear. They show that improving education can yield significant social benefits and can be a key policy tool in the drive to reduce crime.
Introduction
Crime reduction is high on the public policy agenda, not least because of the large economic and social benefits it brings. Indeed, research on the determinants of crime points in several directions as to how crime reduction can be facilitated. For example, a relatively large body of research undertaken by social scientists considers the potential for expenditures on crime fighting resources (like increased police presence, or new crime fighting technologies), or on particular policies, to combat crime. Other work focuses more on the characteristics of criminals and considers what characteristics are more connected to higher criminal participation. In this latter case, policies that affect these characteristics can, if implemented successfully, be used to counter crime.
In this paper, we focus on one such characteristic that has received some attention in the quantitative literature on the determinants of crime, namely education. In this literature, there are a number of studies that relate crime participation to the education of individuals, typically reporting that less educated individuals are more likely to engage in crime.
1 A drawback associated with almost all of this work is that it is difficult to guarantee that the direction of causation flows from education to crime (and not the other way round). This, of course, matters if one wishes to consider appropriate policy responses to empirical findings.
In this paper, we try to carefully isolate the causal empirical connection between crime and education in the UK context. We do so using several different modelling approaches, based on different measures of crime and education from several different data sources. Our results show sizeable effects of education on crime that appear robust to methodological approaches and data sources. The implications of these findings are clear, 1 Examples from the criminology literature include Farrington (1986 Farrington ( , 2001 and from the education literature include Sabates (2008 Sabates ( , 2009 ) and Sabates and Feinstein (2008) . There is much less work by economists. Lochner and Moretti (2004) is a highly notable exception.
showing that improving educational attainment of the marginal individuals can act as a key policy tool in the drive to reduce crime.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives some theoretical background on the relationship between education and crime. Section 3 describes available crime data sources in Britain, their quality and, where relevant, how they can be matched to data on education. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategies that we are able to implement and the results, together with a calculation of the social benefits that follow from the crime reducing effect of education. Concluding remarks are given in the last section of the paper.
How Education Can Impact on Crime
There are number of theoretical reasons why education may have an effect on crime. From the existing socio-economic literature there are (at least) three main channels through which schooling might affect criminal participation: income effects, time availability, and patience or risk aversion. For most crimes, one would expect that these factors induce a negative effect of schooling on crime. In what follows, we discuss each of these channels in more detail.
For the case of income effects, education increases the returns to legitimate work, raising the opportunity costs of illegal behaviour. Consequently, subsidies that encourage investments in human capital reduce crime indirectly by raising future wage rates (Lochner, 2004) . Additionally, punishment for criminal behaviour may entail imprisonment. By raising wage rates, schooling makes any time spent out of the labour market more costly (Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Hjalmarsson, 2008) . Therefore, those who can earn more are less likely to engage in crime.
The idea that education raises skill levels and wage rates, which then lowers crime, is not a new one. Ehrlich (1975) empirically examined a number of predictions from an intuitive model relating education to crime. Grogger (1998) investigated the relationship between wage rates and criminal participation. The author shows that graduating from high school reduces criminal productivity and that criminals have on average less education than non-criminals. Linking crime to wages, Grogger (1998) concludes that youth offending behaviour is responsive to price incentives and that falling real wages may have been an important factor in rising youth crime during the 1970s and 1980s. Machin and Meghir (2004) look at cross-area changes in crime and the low wage labour market in England and Wales. They find that crime fell in areas where wage growth in the bottom 25 th percentile of the distribution was faster and conclude that "improvements in human capital accumulation through the education system or other means… enhancing individual labour market productivity… would be important ingredients in reducing crime."
However, there is also some evidence that education can also increase the earnings from crime and the tools learnt in school may be inappropriately used for criminal activities.
In this sense, education may have a positive effect on crime. Levitt and Lochner (2001) find that males with higher scores on mechanical information tests had increased offence rates.
Lochner (2004) also estimates that across cohorts, increases in average education are associated with 11% increase in white collar arrest rates (although this estimated effect is not statistically significant).
Time spent in education may also be important for teenagers in terms of limiting the time available for participating in criminal activity. This can be thought of as "the cynical explanation is that whilst youngsters are at school they are being kept off the streets," (Hansen, 2003) . This 'self-incapacitation' effect was documented by Tauchen et al. (1994) who found that time spent at school (and work) during a year is negatively correlated to the probability of arrest that year. Hjalmarsson (2008) looked at the opposite relationship of the impact of being arrested and incarcerated before finishing school on probability to graduate.
Her results suggest that the more times you are caught committing crime and the amount of time spent in prison both greatly increases the likelihood of becoming a high school dropout.
As these still may be endogenous decisions, Jacobs and Lefgren (2003) Education may also influence crime through its effect on patience and risk aversion (Lochner and Moretti, 2004) . Here, future returns from any activity are discounted according to one's patience in waiting for them. Thus, individuals with a lot of patience have low discount rates and value future earnings more highly as compared to those with high discount rates. Oreopoulos (2007) summarizes a sample of studies from the from psychological and neurological literatures, concluding that young people who drop out of school tend to be myopic and more focussed on immediate costs from schooling (stress from taking tests, uninteresting curricula, foregone earnings, etc.), rather than on future gains from an additional year of schooling. This line of literature also suggests that adolescents lack abstract reasoning skills and are predisposed to risky behaviour. Education can increase patience, which reduces the discount rate of future earnings and hence reduces the propensity to commit crimes. Education may also increase risk aversion that, in turn, increases the weight given by individuals to a possible punishment and consequently reduces the likelihood of committing crimes.
In summary, if education increases the marginal returns of earnings from legal more than illegal activities, schooling reduces the time available to commit crimes and positively affects patience levels. We therefore expect crime to be decreasing in the number of years of schooling and higher qualification attainment. It is also very likely that, everything else equal, individuals with higher wage rates, those who spend more time in school, and those with lower discount factors, will commit less crime.
Data
In analysing crime and education, a number of data related issues arise. First, there is the issue of crime measurement that is different across data sources. Second, whilst some microdata on crime does contain information on the characteristics of criminals, the majority does not. In the latter case, we need some means of matching crime data to education data. We consider each of these in turn.
Crime Data
Probably the most commonly used source of crime data in quantitative research is information on criminal offences recorded by the police. As not all of these offences are solved, this type of data does not contain information on characteristics of the individuals committing these recorded offences. Unless these data are aggregated to some geographical level (like Police Force Areas) and matched to education data at this level, then it is not possible to use these data to study the empirical relationship between crime and education.
Being realistic, only spatial aggregation is feasible as the offence data cannot be broken down by individual demographic characteristics. This does not offer much hope to credibly study the research question of interest in this paper.
The other main form of crime data available from the criminal justice system is on individuals who enter the criminal justice system after having been apprehended or charged for a crime. The Offenders Index Database (OID) contains information of the characteristics of individual offenders, holding criminal history data for offenders convicted of standard list offences from 1963 onwards. 3 The data is derived from the Court Appearances system and is updated quarterly. The Index was created purely for research and statistical analysis. Its main purpose is to provide full criminal history data on a randomly selected sample of offenders.
The OID dataset we have access to holds anonymous samples for offenders sentenced during four weeks each year from the 1960s onwards. 4 We also have the entire pre and post court appearance history of these individuals after this period. However, there is no information on a defendant's education level in the OID and the data needs to be aggregated in some way to connect to education data. A big advantage (certainly relative to the recorded offences data) is that some demographic characteristics are available in the OID, notably age and gender, and so these data are more suited to a study of crime and education to be undertaken at a level aggregated to the demographic breakdown of crimes that is available. the period since the survey went annual. 6 Using this alternative data source is an important complementary part of our study since it should be relatively free of any biases in arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment probability due to levels of education (which may be a worry when using non self-reported crime information).
Amalgamating Data on Crime and Education
To carry out the cohort analysis, we aggregated the number of OID court appearances by age and gender from 1984 to 2002. 7 We calculated offending rates (per 1000 population) using the ONS population data by age-gender cohort and year. 8 For the estimation results, criminal offences have been broadly categorised as property crimes (burglary, theft and handling stolen goods, and criminal damage) and violent crimes (violence against the person, sexual offences, and robbery).
To this cohort panel, we matched Labour Force Survey (LFS) data on education, and data on wages from the New Earnings Survey. 
Results
There are two main empirical approaches we adopt, the first using micro-data from the 2001
Census cross-section and BCS data, and the second looking at age cohorts from OID data matched to the LFS and NES data sources. We begin by considering basic empirical correlations from both, and then turn to the causal estimates that can be obtained from the cohort data. Columns (2), (3) and (4) Column (4) shows imprisonment gaps between the no qualification and some qualification groups. The gaps are reported in two ways, as percentage gaps and as relative risk ratios (RRR). It is evident that there are large gaps in imprisonment rates that are related to the possession of educational qualifications. Moreover, the gaps are at their largest for the age groups where more people are in prison: see the largest relative risk ratios in the final column for the age 21-25 group, for both men (8.57) and women (8.50). Table 2 presents logit estimates that condition upon an additional range of individual characteristics from the Census (listed in the notes to the Table) . The results are reported for the whole sample, men and women separately, and for the different age groups by gender.
Estimates of Crime-Education Associations a) Census Data on Imprisonment
The logit regression model is based on the log odds ratio (log[p/(1-p)]) where p is a 0/1 variable indicating whether a person is in prison or not), which represents the probability of a success compared with the probability of failure. Hence, an interpretation of estimated coefficients in the logit regression which is usually more intuitive is the 'odds ratio' or the relative risk ratio (RRR), reported in the third column of the Table. The marginal effects, reported in the second column show the change in the probability of imprisonment due to a unit change of an education variable in question.
The results in Table 2 very much confirm the descriptive analysis. Even after conditioning on a range of factors, there is a sizeable gap in imprisonment rates between those with no qualifications and those with some educational qualifications. For the full sample, the RRR of around 4 shows that people with no qualifications are four times more likely to be in prison than those with some qualifications. For young men these odds rise even more, to around 9.1 for 16-20 year olds, and to 14.8 for women in the same age group.
b) Self-Report Data on Criminal Histories
This section considers crime-education associations from self-report data in the British Crime Surveys. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics on two self-report measures on whether individuals have ever been arrested (in Panel A) or whether they have ever been in court as the person accused of committing a crime (Panel B) . Column (1) shows summary statistics for all sample respondents, then broken down by age and gender. Columns (2), and (3) consider breakdowns by level of education, and column (4) the gaps between them.
The upper panel of the percentage point gap to be strongly significant).
The breakdown across demographic (age by gender) groups is also interesting and follows a very similar pattern to the imprisonment rates from the Census data. The biggest percentage point gap in being arrested is the 13.6 points difference we observe for men aged 16-24. Gaps are much lower amongst women of all ages. The bottom Panel of Table 3 shows similar patterns for the other self-report measure, whether an individual reports having been in court as the accused. Overall, 9 percent of the sample report this to be the case, with the percentage being significantly higher for those with no qualifications (at 11.9 percent), and being consistently higher for men. Table 4 reports estimates of coefficients (and associated marginal effects and relative risk ratios) on a no qualifications variable entered into logit regressions of the probability of being arrested or in court as the accused. The strong patterns seen in the descriptive Table   hold up. Individuals with no educational qualifications have significantly higher models of self-reported crime incidence, with relative risks being higher for men, especially younger men. Overall, these results are very similar, in qualitative terms, to the Census imprisonment equations reported in Table 2 .
c) Cross-Cohort Data on Offending Rates
The third piece of observational evidence we consider comes from the cohort panel data we have assembled from OID and LFS/NES data. A first set of results is reported in Table 5 .
Unlike with the Census or BCS analysis we are now able to consider different types of crimes. The upper panel of the Table thus reports results from models of property crimes, whilst the lower panel considers violent crimes. These are useful distinctions to draw if we think education may have less of an impact on violent rather than property offending, given the potential importance of labour market opportunities in explaining the relationship between education and property crime. Because of the availability of more detailed education data in the LFS, we can also consider models where education is measured, as with the analysis to date, in terms of no educational qualifications, but also in terms of years of education. Results from both are considered in the Table. The results in Table 5 provide more evidence of a significant association between crime and education. There are several results of interest. First, the effects seem to be most important for property crimes, and there is little systematic relation with violent crime. This is in line with the use of the standard economic model of crime which predicts that the likely effects of education investments are more likely to be of relevance for property, rather than violent, crime. Second, the significant negative association between property crime and education is revealed in the Table for both measures of education considered.
Causal Estimates from Cross-Cohort Data
The results to date consistently show evidence from observational data of higher crime rates for less educated individuals. However, as we have already noted several times, results from the kinds of exercises considered so far may not reflect the causal impact of education on crime.
To see this for our cohort models, consider a simple least squares regression of a measure of offending for a particular age cohort i in year t ( it O ) with an education variable ( it E ) as an explanatory variable and
) being a set of other control variables:
where it u is an error term in the equation.
If unobserved characteristics of cohorts drive crime participation, but also education, then least squares estimates of 1 α (like those given in Table 5 ) will be biased. This is a key issue to the extent that unobserved characteristics affecting schooling decisions may be correlated with unobservables influencing the decision to engage in crime. For example, 1 α could be estimated to be negative, even if schooling has no causal effect on crime. This would be the case if individuals who have high criminal returns were likely to spend most of their time committing crime rather than work, regardless of their educational background. As long as education does not increase the returns to crime, these individuals are likely to drop out of further education. As a result, we might observe a negative correlation between education and crime even though there is no causal effect between the two. Therefore, the challenge is to find an appropriate instrument for education.
To credibly identify a causal impact of education on crime, we adopt a quasiexperimental approach relying on variations in education induced by changes in compulsory school leaving age laws over time to validate the direction of causation. This is akin to Lochner and Moretti's (2004) approach, which exploits changes in school leaving age laws across US states. We use here two raisings of the school leaving age that occurred in Britain in 1947 and 1973 as instrumental variables in our empirical analysis. 12 Details on the nature, and rationales, for the reform are given in Appendix B.
It needs to be acknowledged that the variation induced by these two instruments is likely to only identify a local impact, as it is much more likely to have an impact at the bottom of the education distribution and very little impact at the top of the education distribution. This is because people near the top would have stayed on after the compulsory school leaving age anyway and the change would not affect them. 13 Therefore, the effect that our empirical approach estimates is the local average treatment (LATE) effect among those who alter their treatment status because they react to the instrument. For this reason, we consider the effects separately for the continuous years of education measure, but also more appropriately for the no qualifications variable. We also show some results where those with no qualifications are compared only to those with slightly higher qualifications.
Identification is achieved through inclusion in a first stage education regression of two dummy variables that record the exogenous change in the minimum school-leaving age In this framework, it is important whether changes in compulsory schooling laws act as valid instruments. A legitimate instrument for education in equation (1) is a variable that: (i) significantly explains part of the variation in education; and (ii) is not correlated with the unobservables that are correlated with both offending and education. Put alternatively, it is a variable that is a determinant of schooling that can legitimately be omitted from equation (1).
To answer the first criteria, let us go back to the definition of our instruments. We use changes over time in the number of years of compulsory education that government imposed as an instrument for years of education. Harmon and Walker (1995) use the same instruments to identify the causal impact of education on wages. They show that the 1947 change was particularly influential in raising participation in post-compulsory education. That is, many of those who would otherwise have left at the old minimum stayed on beyond the new minimum age. Oreopoulos (2006) even argues that his IV estimate of the returns to schooling using only the 1947 change as instrument for education is probably closer to the average treatment effect (ATE) estimator than the LATE, since the 1947 legislation affected almost half of the population. The strength of these compulsory school leaving age changes is very much confirmed in the first stage regressions we report below where there is a strong and highly significant correlation between the two policy changes and education.
Considering the second criteria for a valid instrument, we believe our instruments form a plausible identification strategy since changes in compulsory attendance laws have not historically been concerned by problems with crime. To our knowledge, legislators enacting the laws did not act in response to concerns with juvenile delinquency, youth unemployment, or other factors related to crime, thus making schooling laws an appropriate instrument.
The two-stage least squares (2SLS) results are reported in Table 6 . We present results considering the causal impact of education on property crime.
14 The Table has Table 5 , the second column (columns (2), and (5)) show the education first stages and the third columns ((3), and (6) respectively) give the 2SLS estimates.
15
The first stage regressions are strongly significant, showing there to be no weak instrument problems, and the second stages are precisely determined. In all but one of the six specifications reported, the 2SLS estimate is (in absolute terms) larger in magnitude than the OLS estimate. The exception is for the no qualifications specification for the combined male and female cohorts, and even here one cannot reject the hypothesis that the significant 2SLS estimate is statistically different from the OLS estimate. This is suggestive that the least squares estimates are likely to be lower bounds and therefore that the causal impact of education is at least as sizable. Interestingly, this is the same pattern as the only other paper that we know identifies a causal impact of education on crime with a credible identification strategy, namely the US paper by Lochner and Moretti (2004) . Overall, the pattern that emerges is of a significant causal crime reducing effect of education.
14 The IV strategy was clearly much less effective for the violent crime models and effects were imprecisely estimated. More detailed results are available on request from the authors. 15 Notice that, strictly speaking, the lower panel is a just identified IV model as, due to the age restriction, only the SLA2 instrument can be considered.
In view of the issues raised in our discussion about local average treatment effects, it is interesting to consider results for sub-samples of the population that may have been proportionally more affected by the SLA changes. We do this in two ways in Table 7 where: i) We limit the sample closer to the discontinuity that generated the abrupt education changes by looking at cohorts born 4 years before or after the second SLA change (in columns (1) to (6) for years of education and no qualification compared to some qualification).
ii) We report estimates (columns (7) to (9)) for individuals with no qualification compared to their peers who obtained a minimum qualification level (what we refer to as low qualifications in the Table) .
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The structure of the three panels in Table 7 is the same as in the previous Table. For the around the discontinuity sample, in columns (1) through (6), the magnitudes of the causal estimates rise and are large for the sample of individuals born around the 1973 SLA change threshold. The no qualifications versus low qualifications comparison in columns (7) to (9) produces more muted effects, with strongly significant first stages and in all but one of the reported specification the 2SLS/IV estimates are larger in absolute terms than the OLS ones.
A causal crime reducing effect of education is strong and significant in these 2SLS/IV estimates. Still, the causal estimates remain large and significant with, for example, for the whole sample in the top panel, the estimated 2SLS coefficient suggests that lowering the no qualifications variable by 1 percent would reduce property crime by almost 1.1 percent. We interpret this as a lower bound of the LATE estimates of the causal impact of education on crime.
Discussion
The analysis of the previous section identifies a robust, causal impact of education on property crime. Results on violent crime are more volatile and no clear pattern emerged, most likely because of the much noisier feature of the data. However, the vast majority of crimes that occur are property crimes (these represent more than 70 percent of offences recorded by the police and indictable offences tried in courts). Given that we have identified a sizable crime reducing impact of education, it thus seems interesting to try to say something about the economic importance of such an effect. We have therefore carried out a simple, and in our view informative, calculation of the possible social savings that could result from such crime reduction. Table 8 shows an estimate of the social benefits from crime reduction that would follow from a 1 percent reduction in the percentage of individuals with no educational qualifications. Using cost of crime estimates from Dubourg et al (2005) we calculate that the average cost of a property offence tried in court 17 comes to £1,235.5. There were 16,319
property offences convictions in 2002. We consider 2SLS/IV estimates from Table 6 This is a substantial amount, even for the lower bound estimate comparing no versus low qualifications, especially if one considers that the average cost to the government of a year of education for a secondary school student is approximately £4,000 (Goodman and Sibieta, 2006) . Making the assumption that an extra year of schooling at age 16 is equivalent to obtaining an educational qualification 18 , we estimate that this would cost a little under £22 million to achieve a one percent change in this population. This leaves us with a net social benefit in terms of crime reduction of between £87 and 32 million.
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Of course, this cost-benefit calculation should be carefully interpreted, exercising some degree of caution. For example, general equilibrium effects are not factored in, and we cannot measure the exact cost of obtaining an educational qualification. However, these seem unlikely to significantly offset the large social benefit estimates we obtain from our analysis. 20 We believe these social savings to be large, reaffirming the importance of considering crime reduction as an extra indirect benefit of education policies (as highlighted by Lochner's, 2010, review).
Conclusions
This paper presents new evidence on the effect of education on crime, looking at different data sources from Britain, and paying attention to the causal direction and magnitude of connections between the two. We uncover evidence that crime is significantly related to 18 We believe this to be a reasonable assumption, especially when considering the low qualification reference group. 19 Our net social benefit estimate is much smaller than the $1.4 billion put forward by Lochner and Moretti (2004) . The main reason is that we do not identify a clear impact of education on violent crime and especially murder which account for 80 percent of crime savings. When only considering prevented property crimes, then their estimate is just above $52 million or ₤35 million (at the average 1.5 ₤/$ exchange rate from 2002) which falls very close to our lower bound estimate of the social savings of crime. 20 One way of thinking about general equilibrium effects would be to consider that the increase in the proportion of individuals with some qualification could reduce the wages of workers already with this education level. Considering the wage effects on crime with an elasticity of -1 as reported in Machin and Meghir (2004) , it could be possible that it would increase the crime participation of the latter group. However we believe that this should be more than compensated by the decrease in crimes from the wage premium (estimated at around 40%) experienced by the individuals now obtaining some qualification.
education, especially in the case of property crimes. The magnitudes of the estimated effects are sizable, with causal estimates probably being larger than the non-causal least squares estimates we study. The estimated social savings from crime reduction implied by our estimates are large, being of the order of £54 to £109 million.
Other than Lochner and Moretti (2004) Notes: Based on 16-64 year olds in the 3% Census microdata sample. Notes: Coefficients on No Qualifications dummy variable (standard error in round brackets, marginal effect X 100 in square brackets, RRR is relative risk ratio). All specifications include age dummies, gender dummy (where applicable), non-white dummy, 5 marital status dummies, dummy for in work, dummy for Wales, year dummies. Notes: Models estimated on age-year cells, including a full set of age and year dummy variables, for samples as described in Table between 1984 and 2002 . Standard errors in parentheses. LFS control variables included are: proportion male (in all sample), proportion employed, proportion non-white, and proportion living in London. Notes: As for Table 5 . All models include full sets of age and year dummies, plus LFS controls and NES wage. SLA1 = 1 for those with compulsory school leaving age of 15 (raised from 14 in 1947), = 0 otherwise; SLA2 = 1 for those whose with compulsory school leaving age of 16 (raised from 15 in 1973), = 0 otherwise. Men aged 21 to 40 are not affected (N/A) by SLA1 in the sample we have available. Notes: As for Table 6 . Notes: The cost of crime estimates are taken from Dubourg et al (2005) . The estimated change in crime is adjusted by the number of crimes per conviction (i.e. 1/0.004 = 250). The cost of one year of secondary school per students is from Goodman and Sibieta (2006) .
